


For more information, see <www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/>

MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER		LOCAL DISTRIBUTION		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				CONFIDENTIAL				
CONFIDENTIAL								
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE					
Type Transmission		To	Info					
Electrical		X	X					
Air Mail								
Courier								
PRECEDENCE				UNCLASSIFIED				
ACTION TO:	PRIORITY			DTG 06 0910Z, Nov 67				
INFO	PRIORITY							
FROM : COMUSMACV								
<p>0896L 8 INFO: 310 0935</p> <p>TO : CINCPAC RUEHHHQA JCS RUEPJS STATE RUEHC AID RUEPDA USIA RUEHIA CIA RUEPIA DOD (RUEPJS) WHITE HOUSE RUEPWU</p> <p>JP</p>						<p>CLASSIFIED BY SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 73</p>		
CONFIDENTIAL 36438						FROM: MACJOIR		
<p>SUBJ: Attack on VC Infrastructure, a Progress Report</p> <p>(U) Following describes rather significant forward movement in organizing critical attack on VC infrastructure. Early activities naturally have focussed on organization, training and preparing operating doctrine. Since attacks on infrastructure must be mostly GVN exercise, how-</p>								
DRAFTER	TYPED NAME TITLE PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL			R	SIGNATURE 			
	Paul E. Suplizio Asst Executive Officer 2930/3031			R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE R. W. KOMER RECORDS to COMUSMACV			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	CONFIDENTIAL			2000-01-01	PAGE NO.	No. OF PAGES	10	
						COPY NO.		

CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

ever, chief obstacle to greater progress has been GVN preoccupation with elections and formation new government. This has adopt delayed GVN decision at Saigon level to/program as their own. With new GVN formed, however, we expect our extensive efforts to pay off shortly.

1. (C) Accomplishments.

a. Despite fact GVN has not yet accepted ICEX concept formally at Saigon level, we have been proceeding as vigorously as feasible with GVN corps, province, and district level people in field. With regional differences in method and detail, the US ICEX structure has been set up in the four regions and in the 44 provinces. As might be expected, the variety is greatest at the province level, reflecting not only the availability of assets and resources but also the personalities of the Province ICEX Coordinator and his Province Senior Advisor. Quang Tri, in I Corps, and Binh Duong, in II Corps, stand out as examples of aggressive implementation of ICEX concept. In districts, from a total of 10 in July 1967 the number of DOICCs wholly or partially operating now stands at 53.

DOICCs Activated and Programmed -- 1967

	<u>Activated</u>	<u>Programmed*</u>
I Corps	14	20
II Corps	7	20
III Corps	28	53

CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

	<u>Activated</u>	<u>Programmed*</u>
IV Corps	<u>4</u>	<u>22</u>
	53	115*

*This figure, which was initially 70, then 100, may again be revised as we move into calendar 1968! III Corps may now persist with its aim to place a DOICC in every district, I Corps may raise its goal slightly, and both II Corps and IV Corps anticipate considerable increases, very likely to include smaller, "Demi-DOICCs." In addition to moving ahead with the DOICCs, all regions are striving to upgrade both the capabilities and the utilization of the Provincial Interrogation Centers (PIC) (subject to National Police policies), and to revive the moribund Provincial Intelligence Coordination Centers (PICC).

b. Although planned consolidated progress reporting system has not yet been installed, current RDC and ICEX reporting already show gratifying trends. First, reports of killed, captured or rallied VC now include where possible their identification by name and/or function within their particular VC organization. Second, these reports incorporate what exploitative action has been taken or planned. Third, blacklists and most-wanted lists are being prepared and used to good effect. Fourth, there is noticeable increase in coordinated, joint or combined operations by two or more agencies or services, and more willingness to generate action.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OFFICE SYMBOL

PAGE
NR.NR. OF
PAGES

3 10

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

based on other agencies' information. Although the PRU appear to be the most effective "file shot" action arm, the spectrum of exploitation forces ranges from armed PSB squads to air and artillery strikes and psyops leaflet drops. Hoi Chanh are being widely employed or exploited in increasing number and ways.

c. Our biggest immediate problem is delay in national-level GVN decision to carry out an ICEX-type program. Because of its preoccupation with elections and uncertainty as to composition of new regime, we were unable to get GVN to complete its staff work. Also disheartening was the initial reluctance of the National Police to support the DOICC concept, even in III Corps where the strong support of Generals Khang and Weyand maintained the momentum of new DOICC activation. By late October, however, the mood was perceptibly changing. In II Corps, for example, General Vinh Loc endorsed the ICEX concept as his own and is drafting a joint directive, to include support of the DOICCs. In Duc Hue district of Hau Nghia Province, a precedent was set in the appointment of a PSB officer as the DOICC Chief. In Saigon, from informal conversations with General Loan, we have gathered that his earlier misgivings and misunderstandings as to the DOICCs have been overcome. Loan seems assured that the organizational integrity of the Police is not threatened, that police intelligence sources and operations need not be revealed, and that police par-

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE SYMBOL

MACJOIR

PAGE
NR.

4

NO. OF
PAGES

10

ticipation in the DOICCs will be to their advantage. General Loan has agreed to visit selected DOICCs in III Corps in November.

d. A proposed decree to double the number of GVN Military Field Courts to eight now awaits signature and promulgation by the Chief of State.

2. (C) Future Plans and Actions Under Way. With the organizational phase largely completed, although DOICCs will continue to be established and ICEX military augmentation personnel continue to be assigned, we are moving into the operational phase. Aside from completing negotiations with GVN, therefore, ICEX emphasis will be placed on guidance, support, reporting and review of field operations and on monitoring the progress of construction and utilization of new screening and detention facilities. Some specific actions now under way or planned include:

a. Implement consolidated progress reporting system; refine and streamline all ICEX and Project TAKEOFF/Attack on Infrastructure reporting (eliminate duplication); study proposals to revise and refine CORRAL reporting; continue to follow HES development with a view to correlation with ICEX reporting; investigate other proposals for program reporting/management.

b. Continue the present program of implementing ICEX Memoranda, Operational Aids (in both English and Vietnamese) and ICEX Newsletters.

CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

c. Investigate applications of ADP to:

- (1) program evaluation;
- (2) support of operations, including central indexing, collation. (For example: extension of CT-4 type support to other areas, on a selective or priority area basis initially; look into possibility of programming at the PIC; etc.)
- (3) control of movement of VC civil detainees, interrogees, other prisoners.

d. Continue the programs of ICEX briefing and indoctrination both by ICEX Staff and by CORPS ICEX staffs, to include briefing of Free World tactical units and sector and subsector headquarters. Expand the two-way flow of intelligence information, both tactical and infrastructure, as required.

e. Extend selectively and gradually the CSC program of awards/rewards to other cities and province capitals. Establish liaison and coordination between US/GVN, civil/military awards programs for volunteering of information on VC personalities and activities.

f. Develop working ICEX liaison and staff coordination with whatever GVN entities are designated for this purpose; assist them in planning and implementation of a parallel GVN program.

(1) In particular, work with PSD toward improving the NPFF contribution to the attack on VC infrastructure.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	OFFICE SYMBOL	PAGE NR.	NR. OF PAGES
CONFIDENTIAL	MACVJOIR	6	10

CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

g. Plan and implement the second phase of "ICEX/SIDE":

(1) Monitor the construction and use of new screening and detention facilities, help determine and plan to meet further requirements;

(2) Ascertain the effect of these added facilities on other ICEX activities (rate of captures and arrests, unauthorized release of detainees and suspects, volume and speed of trial and sentencing, Chieu Hoi rate and content, etc);

(3) Investigate further proposals to speed up judicial processing and to obviate unauthorized or improper release of suspects;

(4) Encourage development of rehabilitation and re-education of VC detainees, and of an organized amnesty program, to include some form of non-punitive surveillance and control of non-punitive surveillance and control of released "ex-VC."

3. (C) Problem Areas. The bulk of ICEX major problems derive from the fact that ICEX is still an "unprogrammed program." It was envisioned as a structure that would live off the land, deriving its support from existing programs. This has not proved to be entirely practicable, except in the area of operations. The management and coordination structure, both now and as it continues to grow in the districts and provinces, will require resources which cannot be arbitrarily charged to any existing programs. For example:

a. Personnel. Thanks mainly to the support of ACoIS, J2 and of the US Naval Forces Vietnam, the authorized US military

CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

augmentation of 126 officers and NCO's will be in place by end December 1967. Seven fulltime US Army (MACV) personnel have been provided for the ICEX Staff in Saigon. The only requirements outstanding are one O-4 as Deputy Director, ICEX Staff. (Others will require replacement as their tours end).

It is now evident, however, that the 126 will not nearly suffice in the regions. Already, a total of 40 additional military personnel are being furnished to ICEX in I and III Corps. LTG Rosson has advised that in II Corps alone, he believes that 176 military personnel are required. Because of regional differences, each Corps ICEX Coordinator should project his own personnel requirements; based on conversations to date with them, however, we can arrive at the following rough estimates of possible future ICEX field needs:

	Present Auth.	Required End of Dec 67	Estimated 1 July 68
Corps	12	12	16
Province	44	44	68
District	70	100	125
	<u>126</u>	<u>156(1)</u>	<u>229(2)</u>

(1) Manning at present level, estimated goal for DOIICCs. This figure could rise to 171 if the later estimate of 115 DOIICCs is realized.

(2) This figure includes one additional NCO at each PIC, or where there is no PIC, an extra NCO to assist in collation at Province level; it also estimates a total of 125 DOIICCs, with one US advisor each, and an additional officer at each Corps.

b. Funding. Arrangements are being completed whereby

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE SYMBOL

MACJ01R

PAGE
NR.NR. OF
PAGES

8

10

1. *On the Nature of the Human Species* (1859)

Section 17.109

卷之三

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

OSA will fund 1/3 and MACV 2/3 of the estimated costs for the remainder of FY 1968 for establishment and operation of approximately 100 DODCCs and for related expenses, to the extent that these costs and expenses, mostly piasters, cannot properly be met by existing programs. However, the precise amount of MACV funds available has not been fully determined, nor has implementing guidance been sent to the field, as of 30 October. Meanwhile, field costs to date have been met and materiel supplied by OSA. Other needs have been met by scrounging and by use of the imprest fund.

c. Vehicles. Similarly, the number of vehicles available at sector and subsector is not sufficient to support the needs of the new ICEX personnel. Hence, exploratory action has been initiated to acquire up to 163 Ford "Broncos" and/or jeeps for corps, province and district (one to each place).

d. Communications. For other than command and policy communications, the OSA electronic and courier communications system has been found thus far to be most practicable for the conduct of routine business. For conduct of operations, however, at province and district, there is available no secure electronic communications which cannot be monitored easily by the Viet Cong. This problem is not unique to IGOEX. Anti-infrastructure operations by small units against the VC target must enjoy complete surprise if they are to have any hope of success.

4. (C) Conclusions. On the US side, the spirit is improving and operational cooperation excellent. The growing pains of support can be overcome. But the real crunch is yet to come: Will

S. S. NARAYANAN ET AL.

OFFICE SYMBOL
CONFIDENTIAL

the Vietnamese really be willing to go all out and apprehend, try and imprison, or destroy identified and identifiable VC infrastructure? The key lies not in our new organization and training, but in the decision of the GVN corps commanders, division commanders, province and district chiefs and police chiefs. Signs that they will are favorable.

GP-4

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	OFFICE SYMBOL	PAGE NR.	NR. OF PAGES
CONFIDENTIAL	MACJOIR	10	10